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The Odd Couple: How Justices
Kennedy and Scalia, Together,
Advanced Gay Rights in
Romer v. Evans

by Tobin A. Sparling*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Amidst the excitement surrounding the flurry of decisions supporting
gay marriage' which culminates in the United States Supreme Court's
affirmation of same-sex marriage in Obergefell v. Hodges, Romer v.
Evans,' the Supreme Court's first step on the road to marriage equality,
has not received the recognition it deserves. Yet, as its twentieth
anniversary nears, Romer warrants a reexamination and greater
recognition of its place in the advancement of gay rights. Decided in
1996, Romer held that Amendment 2 to the Colorado constitution4
violated the Equal Protection Clause5 because the amendment discouraged the enactment of laws banning discrimination based on sexual
orientation.6 The decision marked the beginning of an era in which the

* Professor of Law, South Texas College of Law. Dartmouth College (B.A., 1975);
Columbia University, School of Library Service (M.S., 1976); Columbia University,
Graduate School of Arts & Sciences, Department of Art History (M.A., 1977); Columbia
University School of Law (J.D., 1988). Member, State Bar of Texas.
1. See Marriage Litigation, FREEDOM TO MARRY (Mar. 2, 2015), http://www.
freedomtomarry.org/litigation (providing a comprehensive list of same-sex marriage
statuses in the United States).
2. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
3. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
4. See COLO. CONST. art. II, § 30b.
5. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
6. Romer, 517 U.S. at 623-24.
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Court examined the discrimination faced by homosexual people
differently and finally took it seriously.7
In the Romer majority opinion, Associate Justice Anthony Kennedy
portrayed the effect of Amendment 2 on gay Coloradans as an affront to
human dignity." Only ten years earlier in Bowers v. Hardwick,' a
majority of the Supreme Court upheld laws criminalizing homosexual
conduct and implied that gay people lacked any dignity at all.o In this
respect, Romer marked a significant change in the way the Court
characterized gay people."
Nevertheless, Justice Kennedy's majority opinion, however wellmeaning, suffered in a number of respects. Focusing on human dignity
as a universal moral imperative, which the United States Constitution
must protect, the opinion relegated gay rights to the sideline. 12 Justice
Kennedy's evident desire to craft a "landmark" opinion further impaired
its effectiveness. His reliance on hyperbole and moral platitudes proved
to be distancing. The opinion's majestic tone lacked a sense of either
Indeed, the opinion read more like moral
immediacy or urgency.
philosophy than a response to a specific injurious action.
This Article argues Romer's positive impact is attributable as much to
Justice Scalia's strident, angry dissent as to the majority opinion itself.
That dissent brought gay rights to the fore of the question. It argued
the cause for social disfavor of homosexual behavior in the strongest of
terms."3 However, this angry dissent, by its very association with the
majority opinion, framed the majority opinion in a more overtly gay
rights context.'" Attributing to the majority opinion a gay rights
agenda, which Justice Kennedy had never enunciated, Justice Scalia
Paradoxically, this edgier makeover
effectively radicalized it.'"
appealed to and energized gay rights advocates in a way that Justice

7. See id. at 635 (asserting a state does not further a proper legislative end to make
homosexual persons unequal to everyone else).
8. See id. (concluding that "Amendment 2 classifies homosexuals not to further a
proper legislative end but to make them unequal to everyone else").
9. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
10. See id. at 195-96.
11. Compare Bowers, 478 U.S. at 197 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (citing approvingly of
Blackstone's characterization of homosexuality as "a disgrace to human nature"), with
Romer, 517 U.S. at 635 (asserting, "A State cannot so deem a class of persons [homosexuals] a stranger to its laws").
12. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 633, 635 (discussing Amendment 2 in terms of "persons" and
a "single trait" instead of in terms of homosexuals and homosexuality).
13. See generally id. at 636-53 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
14. Id.
15. See id. at 636 (asserting the majority holding stands for the proposition that
"opposition to homosexuality is as reprehensible as racial or religious bias").
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Kennedy's opinion, standing alone, probably could not. Thus, Justice
Scalia played a critical role in making Romer a landmark decision on the
gay rights front.
Part II of this Article discusses the legal and social landscape of Romer
and the looming presence of Bowers. Part III explores generally the
distinctive aspects of both Justice Kennedy's and Justice Scalia's writing
in Romer. Part IV discusses the Romer opinions in detail. It explains
how Justice Scalia's dissent enhanced the impact of Justice Kennedy's
majority opinion. Finally, Part V assesses how this "odd couple's"
opinions in Romer contributed to the advancement of gay rights in
America.
II.

BOWERS V. HARDWICK AND THE

GAY RIGHTS MOVEMENT BEFORE ROMER

In Bowers v. Hardwick, decided in 1986, the United States Supreme
Court dealt a substantial blow to the nascent gay rights movement by
holding that the United States Constitution permitted states to
criminalize homosexual conduct.16 Quiet advocacy for gay rights had
begun decades earlier. In 1924, Henry Gerber established the Society
for Human Rights, the first organization to advocate for homosexual
rights." During the 1950s, the Mattachine Society and the Daughters
of Bilitis, a lesbian organization, formed with similar agendas.'"
Although not the first public protest of discrimination against homosexual people,'" the Stonewall Riots of June 28, 1968 are often credited as

16. 478 U.S. at 196; see also Elizabeth Sheyn, The Shot HeardAround the LGBT World:
Bowers v. Hardwick as a Mobilizing Force for the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force,
4 J. RACE, GENDER & ETHNICITY 2, 2 (2009) (calling Bowers "a clear setback for the gay
rights movement").
17. Pride & Prejudice: An Interactive Timeline of the Fight for Gay Rights, TIME (June
26, 2015), http://www.time.com/3937550/same-sex-marriage-supreme-court-timeline/.
18. Will Roscoe, Mattachine:RadicalRoots of the Gay Movement, FOUND S.F. (Mar. 4,
2015), http://foundsf.org/index.phptitle=Mattachine:_RadicalRoots of theGay.Movement
(explaining that the Mattachine Society was formed in San Francisco in 1950 to protest
discrimination against gays and encourage, in the words of the Society's Statement of
Mission and Purposes, a "highly ethical homosexual culture"); UnheardVoices, Stories of
LGBT History, Phyllis Lyon, the Daughters of Bilitis and the Homophile Movement, ANTIDEFAMATION LEAGUE (2011), http://www.glsen.org/sites/default/files/Phyllis%20Lyon%20

Backgrounder.pdf. Established in 1955 as a social group, the Daughters of Bilitis
eventually took on a broader agenda and described itself as "A Woman's Organization for
the purpose of Promoting the Integration of the Homosexual into Society." Unheard Voices,
Stories of LGBT History, supra.
19. Nan D. Hunter, Sexuality & Civil Rights: Re-ImaginingAnti-DiscriminationLaws,
17 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 565, 568 (2000) (describing a 1965 protest in Philadelphia at
a restaurant that refused to serve homosexuals and picketing in front of the White House
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the spark that ignited the modern gay rights movement.2 0 In conjunction with New York City policy to shut down gay establishments and
arrest suspected homosexuals, the police raided the Stonewall Inn in
Greenwich Village. Its gay and transgender patrons fought back,
making front-page news. 2 ' A year later, to mark the anniversary of the
Stonewall Riots, the first gay rights parades in the United States
occurred in New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, and San Francisco.22
Within several years, the Stonewall Riots inspired the formation of gay
rights organizations in most of the country's major cities.2 3
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, gay rights activism became more
visible in tandem with the rise of the feminist and abortion rights
movements.24 Some political successes occurred at the local and state
levels with the passage of regulations protecting gay people from
discrimination2 5 and the repeal of sodomy statutes.26 However, public
hostility towards homosexuality remained prevalent, and organizations
formed to oppose gay rights. In 1977, singer Anita Bryant established
the group Save Our Children to counter homosexual activists' proposition 2 7 that "theirs is an acceptable alternate way of life." 28 Her group
successfully led the effort to repeal a Miami-Dade County regulation
banning discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation."

by the Mattachine Society to seek job protections for homosexuals like those extended
under the recently enacted Civil Rights Act of 1964).
20. William N. Eskridge, Jr., No PromoHomo: The Sedimentation ofAntigay Discourse
and the Channeling Effect of JudicialReview, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1327, 1336 n.25 (2000)
(noting that "'Stonewall' is generally viewed as the beginning of a mass gay rights
movement"); Stonewall Riots: The Beginning of the LGBT Movement, LEADERSHIP
CONFERENCE (June 22, 2009), http://www.civilrights.org/archives/2009/06/449-stonewall.html (calling the riots "a catalyst for the LGBT movement for civil rights in the United

States").
21.
22.
23.
24.

Pride& Prejudice,supra note 17.
Stonewall Riots, supra note 20.
Id.
Andrew Hartman, The CultureWars: Notes Towards a Working Definition, SOCIETY

FOR UNITED STATES INTELLECTUAL HISTORY: U.S. INTELLECTUAL HISTORY BLOG (Mar. 11,

2011), http://s-usih.org/2011/03/culture-wars-notes-towards-working.html (tying the culture
wars to the women's movement and the gay rights movement).
25. Hunter, supra note 19, at 568-69 (noting the enactment of the first such ordinance
in East Lansing, Michigan in 1972).
26. Eskridge, No Promo Homo, supra note 20, at 1342 (stating that eighteen states
repealed their sodomy laws between 1976 and 1979).
27. Id. at 1351.
28. Pride & Prejudice, supra note 17; see also Eskridge, No Promo Homo, supra note
20, at 1351.
29. Pride& Prejudice, supra note 17.
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Bowers demonstrated how tenuous the efforts to achieve public
acceptance of gay rights really were."o At the time of the Court's
decision, twenty-four states and the District of Columbia still criminalized sodomy between consenting adults."' In 1982, Michael Hardwick
had been charged with engaging in sex with another man in violation of
a Georgia statute,3 2 which made homosexual and heterosexual sodomy
a criminal offense." Hardwick asserted that, as a practicing homosexual, the statute violated his Ninth Amendment 4 and due process rights
under the United States Constitution to engage in private and intimate
association.35 The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit ruled in Hardwick's favor." The Supreme Court, however,
reversed in a five-to-four decision."
Associate Justice Byron White wrote the majority opinion, which
was accompanied by separate concurrences by Chief Justice Warren
Burger" and Associate Justice Louis Powell.40 Justice Blackman
wrote the dissent.4 1 Chief Justice Burger, however, wrote the statement that summed up the Hardwick holding best-"[I]n constitutional
terms there is no such thing as a fundamental right to commit homosexual sodomy."42 Thus, the Court transformed the case from a right to
privacy to a right to commit homosexual sodomy.
Justice White immediately distinguished sodomy from the actions
previously extended under the right to privacy.43
He noted, "No
connection between family, marriage, or procreation on the one hand and

30. Sheyn, supra note 16, at 2 (asserting the decision constituted "a sign that the Court
and, by extension, society, did not accept homosexuals").
31. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 193.

32.

See O.C.G.A. § 16-6-62 (2011).

33.

Bowers, 478 U.S. at 187-88.

34.

See U.S. CoNsT. amend. IX.

35. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 189.
36. Id. (citing Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202 (11th Cir. 1985)).
37. Id. at 186.
38. Id. at 187.
39. Id. at 196 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
40. Id. at 197 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell agreed Hardwick had no
fundamental right under the Due Process Clause to engage in homosexual conduct. Id.
In dicta, he indicated a long prison sentence for such conduct, though, could raise an
Eighth Amendment claim. Id. However, since Hardwick had not been tried, an Eighth
Amendment claim would not apply here. Id. at 198.
41. Id. at 199 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The dissent argued the majority had
improperly focused on Hardwick's homosexual status, which it deemed irrelevant, and
ignored his valid privacy and freedom of intimate association claims. Id. at 201-03.
42. Id. at 196 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
43. Id. at 190 (majority opinion).
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homosexual activity on the other hand ha[d] been demonstrated." 44
Additionally, sodomy could not be deemed one of "those fundamental
liberties" 4 that are "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition." 46
Having outlined America's long history of laws banning
homosexual conduct, Justice White asserted that equating sodomy to
Chief Justice Burger's concurfundamental rights was "facetious."
rence expounded this argument in more graphic terms. He observed,
"Blackstone described 'the infamous crime against nature' as an offense
of 'deeper malignity' than rape, a heinous act 'the very mention of which
is a disgrace to human nature,' and 'a crime not fit to be named."' 48
Justice White also ruled out finding, under the Due Process Clause,49
a new fundamental right to homosexual conduct.o To do so would
expand the Court's authority beyond constitutional bounds."
In
addition, it did not matter that the conduct had occurred between
consenting adults in a private home.52 Justice White noted that
making an exception for consenting adults to engage in homosexual
conduct at home would open the door to the protection of illegal drug
use, adultery, incest, and other crimes in which consenting adults
engaged at home or in a similar setting.
Finally, even if homosexual conduct were not a fundamental right,
Hardwick argued that its prohibition still violated the Due Process
Clause. 4 Moral disapproval, he asserted, did not provide a rational
basis for its ban." Justice White, however, disposed of this argument
in short order. He noted that many laws derived from moral precepts
and found no reason why proscriptions of sodomy should prove an exception." Chief Justice Burger chimed in, concluding, "To hold that the
act of homosexual sodomy is somehow protected as a fundamental right
would be to cast aside millennia of moral teaching."

44. Id. at 191.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 192 (quoting Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)).
47. Id. at 194.
48. Id. at 197 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (emphasis in original) (quoting the Blackstone
commentaries).
49. See U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV.
50. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 194-95.
51. Id. at 195 (noting the issue at hand "falls far short" of the Court's "great resistance
to expand the substantive" reach of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 195-96.
54. Id. at 196.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 197 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
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Although the decision in Bowers angered the gay community and
energized its commitment to reform, the decision dealt a significant blow
to the gay rights movement." Efforts to convince legislatures to repeal
In the family law arena, gay parents
sodomy statutes stalled."
suffered grievously in custody adjudications. Courts cited and quoted
Bowers to demonstrate gay parents' moral unfitness and limited the
parents' access to their children."o Indeed, Bowers' corrosive characterization of homosexuality and its frequent repletion in lower courts made
the denigration of gay people almost respectable." With the contemporaneous onset of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS), the
advent of right-wing talk radio, and the rapid growth and assertion of
political power of conservative evangelicals and their associated
organizations, publically-voiced disdain of homosexuals became
commonplace.6 2 Thus, throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the gay rights,
feminist, and abortion rights movements, along with the campaign for
artistic freedom, served as the focal point in an ongoing debate between
conservative advocates of traditional moral values and liberal proponents
6
The Supreme Court
of self-actualization and personal fulfillment.
64
considered Romer v. Evans while this so-called "culture war" raged.
III.

DIFFERENT WRITERS, DIFFERENT AIMS

In Romer v. Evans, Justice Kennedy and Justice Scalia squared off on
the Supreme Court's first case involving state action and gay rights since
Bowers v. Hardwick. Coloradan voters had passed Amendment 2 to the
The amendment repealed several cities'
Colorado Constitution.
ordinances banning sexual orientation discrimination and made their
reinstatement contingent on a subsequent amendment of the constitution." Gay rights advocates argued Amendment 2 violated the Equal

58. Sheyn, supra note 16, at 2 (calling Bowers "a clear setback for the gay rights
movement" but noting it also "galvanized gay activists and lesbian, gay, bisexual and
transgender ("LGBT") organizations").
59. Id. at 25 (noting that between 1986 and 1991 no state sodomy laws were repealed).
60.

See Tobin A. Sparling, JudicialBias Claims of Homosexual Persons in the Wake of

63.

IRENE TAVISS THOMSON, CULTURE WARS AND ENDURING AMERICAN DILEMMAS 2

Lawrence v. Texas, 46 S. TEx. L. REv. 255, 284-85 (2004) (noting the difficulty of
combatting institutional bias against homosexuals while Bowers remained good law).
61. Id. at 256 ("Bowers, which has been condemned by many commentators as the
epitome ofjudicial homophobia, provided an authoritative cover for judicial bias and served
as a template for scores of decisions disabling homosexuals of a wide variety of rights.").
62. Hartman, supra note 24.
(2010).
64. Id.

65. Romer, 517 U.S. at 623, 624.
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Protection Clause of the United States Constitution." Romer provided
a showcase for Justice Kennedy's and Justice Scalia's different writing
styles and different aims.
Nevertheless, Justice Kennedy's and Justice Scalia's opinions in Romer
shared certain qualities, however different the respective authors'
perspectives. Recognizing the wide public interest generated by gay
rights issues, Justice Kennedy and Justice Scalia crafted opinions
intended for a public, as well as a legal, audience. Both justices appear
to have strived to generate quotable phrases. Both justices also drafted
opinions with an inherent, although vastly different, musicality. The
similarities between their opinions ended there.
Justice Kennedy's majority opinion in Romer could be compared to
classic grand opera. He sought, like many operatic composers, to focus
on essential elements of the human condition in a way that transcended
the current time and place. Interestingly, Justice Kennedy singled out
the writing in the Declaration of Independence as particularly compelling." In Romer, Justice Kennedy could almost be channeling the
Declaration's author, Thomas Jefferson.
Like the Declaration of
Independence, his Romer opinion highlighted fundamental principles of
liberty and citizenship, not the minutiae of rule-making or legal tests."
In Romer, Justice Kennedy aimed for grandeur. Embellishment took
precedence over simplicity. Rhetoric subsumed plain speaking. In lieu
of stating that Amendment 2 also lacks any rational basis he wrote, "We
conclude that, in addition to the far-reaching deficiencies of Amendment
2 that we have noted, the principles it offends, in another sense, are
conventional and venerable; a law must bear a rational relationship to
a legitimate governmental purpose."6 9 Thus, in musical terms, his
writing evoked the long phrases and swelling crescendos of Puccini or
Verdi." Some observers have found it "majestic,"" while others have
criticized it as "pompous" and pretentious.7 2 Some truth lies in both

66. Id. at 623-24.
67. Bryan A. Garner, Justice M. Kennedy, 13 SCRIBES J. LEGAL WRITING 79, 79 (2010)
(noting the Declaration of Independence "has a dramatic progression to it").
68. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 631.
69. Id. at 635.
70. Bill Mears, Is Anthony Kennedy 'the First Gay Justice'?, CNN (June 28, 2013),
http://www.cnn.com/2013/06/27/politics/scotus-kennedy/ (referring to Justice Kennedy's
"sweeping rhetoric").
71. Id. (quoting former Kennedy law clerk, Professor Michael Dorf: "Justice Kennedy
makes clear that he not only accepts, but welcomes the task of writing majestic opinions
affirming the dignity of gay persons and couples").
72. Jeffrey Rosen, Strong Opinions, NEW REPUBLIC (July 28, 2011), http//www.new
republic.com/articlelpolitics/magazine/92773/elena-kagan-writings (calling Justice Kennedy's

20161
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views. Yet, undeniably, Justice Kennedy's writing in Romer appeared
heart-felt and genuine, as when he declared, "A State cannot so deem a
class of persons a stranger to its laws."73
Justice Kennedy has explained that precedent and historical tradition
take a back seat when he reviews questions of constitutional magnitude. 74 His thought process involves "a substantive consideration of
whether the government action challenged in the case violates 'the
essentials of the right to human dignity.' 7
He fundamentally
questions whether the state has fostered "the inability of the person to
manifest his or her own personality, the inability of a person to obtain
his or her self-fulfillment, [or] the inability of a person to reach his or
her own potential."76
In Romer, the minimal citation to precedent and avoidance of
traditional legal tests were consonant with Justice Kennedy's belief that
moral imperatives transcend traditional foundations of judicial review.
Benefits and disadvantages arose from this approach. Romer generated
a ringing pronouncement from Justice Kennedy that disparate treatment
in the political process violates the personal dignity of those to whom it
is directed. He observed, "[Amendment 2's] sheer breadth is so
discontinuous with the reasons offered for it that the amendment seems
inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class it affects; it lacks
a rational relationship to legitimate state interests.",7 Yet, ultimately,
the generality and subjectivity inherent in this animus-based approach
made Romer less useful to courts that were more accustomed to
following specific legal tests than less, well-defined moral principles."
Paradoxically, while Justice Kennedy's opinion in Romer expressed
universal moral precepts, it also revealed considerable caution and
restraint, most notably in its treatment of homosexuality. He rarely
addressed head-on the homosexual context of the question. More
frequently, he argued in terms of single traits, disadvantaged groups,
and single classes, not of homosexuality, gay men, and lesbians.7 ' He

writing "pompous").
73. Romer, 517 U.S. at 635.
74. FRANK J. COLLUCI, JUSTICE KENNEDY'S JURISPRUDENCE: THE FULL AND NECESSARY
MEANING OF LIBERTY 4 (2009).
75. Id. at 3.
76. Id. at 3-4.
77. Romer, 517 U.S. at 632.
78. See Nan D. Hunter, Animus Thick and Thin: The Broader Impact of the Ninth
Circuit Decision in Perry v. Brown, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 111, 113 (2012), http://www.
stanfordlawreview.org/online/animus-thick-thin (noting "the concept of animus marked
highly contested ground" even within the Supreme Court itself).
79. Romer, 517 U.S. at 632.
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chose "animus," not homophobia, as the watchword of the opinion.80
Although the issue in Romer directly involved-and would directly
affect-gay people, he oddly pushed them to the peripheries. Thus,
Justice Kennedy's majority opinion appeared written more in the spirit
of the "love that dare not speak its name"" than of "out and proud" gay
rights advocacy. Above all, he strove to be polite and not offend anyone.
Justice Scalia, on the other hand, actively sought to offend, making his
dissent more like rap than grand opera. Unlike Justice Kennedy,
Justice Scalia had no dealings with majesty or timelessness." Like a
rapper, he focused on the here and now-acceptance of homosexual
conduct-and aimed to deliver a punch to its gut. Similar to rap, Justice
Scalia's dissent in Romer bristled with discordant emotions. They
ranged from incredulity, exasperation, dismissiveness, irritation, anger,
and plain rudeness. He wrote forthrightly and pugnaciously." Justice
Scalia focused his targets clearly within his and the readers' sights. In
Romer, he explained in simple terms what irked him before shooting it
down." More importantly, he gave the impression that he had pierced
the veil that Justice Kennedy's grand themes had thrown over the real
issues at hand."5 For example he asserted, "In holding that homosexuality cannot be singled out for disfavorable treatment, the Court ...
places the prestige of this institution behind the proposition that
opposition to homosexuality is as reprehensible as racial or religious
bias."" Thus, Justice Scalia appeared, in his Romer dissent, to disclose
inside knowledge of the inner workings and motivations of the majority
opinion.
Justice Scalia then brought his penchant for drama into play, and
overstatement became the name of his game. He not only placed Justice
Kennedy's fundamental principles and generic analyses within a specific
gay rights context, but he also blew them out of proportion, beyond

80. See id. at 632, 633 (discussing Amendment 2 in terms of "persons" and a "single
trait" instead of in terms of homosexuals and homosexuality).
81. LORD ALFRED DOUGLAS, Two LOVES, in THE CHAMELEON (1894), available at
http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/wilde/poemsofdouglas.htm (a euphemism for
homosexuality, coined by Oscar Wilde's lover, Lord Alfred Douglas).
82. See generally Conor Clarke, How Scalia Lost His Mojo, SLATE (July 5, 2006),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news-and-politics/jurisprudence/2006/07/howscalialosthismojo.html (describing Justice Scalia's writing generally as "Catholic-school headmistress
meets Vladimir Nabokov").
83. See id. (noting that Justice Scalia's writing generally is "accessible," and that he
"tries not to get bogged down in abstruse legal jargon").
84. See, e.g., Romer, 517 U.S. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
85. See id. at 638.
86. Id. at 636.
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Justice Kennedy's probable intentions. The meanings he imputed to the
majority opinion made it appear more radical than Kennedy wrote. For
example, Justice Scalia asserted, "Th[e] Court has no business imposing
upon all Americans the resolution favored by the elite class from which
the Members of this institution are selected, pronouncing that 'animosHe intended, of course, to
ity' toward homosexuality . . . is evil."8
create a straw man, which he could easily knock down. However, he
also unintentionally gave Justice Kennedy's polite platitudes an edge
Thus, while the radicalization of Justice
they otherwise lacked.
vanilla
ideology played well to Justice Scalia's
relatively
Kennedy's
also
appealed to supporters of gay rights. By
it
audience,
conservative
Kennedy's mouth, Justice Scalia
in
Justice
putting
words
effectively
rights
agenda to a degree that would not
the
gay
spurred
unintentionally
opinion appeared alone.
majority
Kennedy's
had
Justice
occurred
have
IV.

THE SYMBIOTIC NATURE OF ROMER's
MAJORITY OPINION AND DISSENT

Romer v. Evans introduced the dueling themes that Justice Kennedy
and Justice Scalia more fully developed in the gay rights cases that
followed. The majority held that a regulation is presumptively the
product of animus and, therefore, unconstitutional when it makes
participation in government harder for an unpopular class of persons."
Those persons, in Romer, happened to be homosexual." Justice Scalia
responded, chastising the majority's implicit holding that disapproval of
homosexual conduct was as morally objectionable as disapproval on the
basis of race and religion."o Thus, Romer gave birth to a duet that
2
recurred in Lawrence v. Texas" and United States v. Windsor.1
Romer featured Justice Kennedy's yin of high-minded morality answered
by Justice Scalia's yang of pointed indignation.
Romer examined whether an amendment to Colorado's constitution,
adopted through a statewide referendum, violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the United States Constitution.9 3 The enactment of ordinances forbidding discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in a
variety of contexts in several Colorado cities triggered the amendment,

87. Id. (quoting majority opinion at 634).
88. Id. at 633 (majority opinion).
89. Id. at 625.
90. Id. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
91. 539 U.S. 558, 578-79 (2003) (holding Texas' sodomy statute unconstitutional).
92. 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2682 (2013) (holding unconstitutional the Defense of Marriage Act's
definition of marriage as between a man and a woman).
93. Romer, 517 U.S. at 623.
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called Amendment 2.9 Amendment 2 repealed those bans.95 It also
made subsequent adoptions of similar protections by local or state
governments contingent upon the passage of a constitutional amendment
approving them."
Justice Kennedy revealed Amendment 2's constitutional infirmity in
his first sentence of Romer when he quoted an iconic passage from
Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson7 -"[T]he Constitution
Justice
'neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.""'
in
the
opinion
frame
to
his
intention
also
indicated
Kennedy, thereby,
iconic
equally
Indeed,
gay,
rights."
than
rather
terms of universal,
expressions of universal rights by Justice Fred Vinsonoo and Justice
0
appear at key points throughout Romer and serve
Stanley Matthews'o
as its underlying foundation. These quotations created a platform from
which Justice Kennedy could argue above the fray of the so-called
culture war between liberals and conservatives at the time of Romer's
writing. Justice Kennedy's use of these quotations was revealing in
Each use epitomized judicial phraseology that
another respect.
transcended the context in which it had been written. Thus, these
passages constituted the kind of writing that Justice Kennedy so much
admired. Notably, in the last paragraph of Romer, he attempted such
a phrase of his own-"A State cannot so deem a class of persons a
stranger to its laws."102
In Romer, Justice Kennedy performed the time-honored practice of
"bait and switch." Ostensibly, the analysis relied on the rational basis
test typically employed in equal protection cases. Justice Kennedy
explained early on that this "most deferential of standards" demarcates
He subsequently
the line beyond which the Court cannot act.'0o
invoked rational basis terminology throughout the opinion.' 0 4

94. Id. at 623-24. These ordinances related to housing, employment, education, public
accommodations, and health and welfare services. Id. at 624.
95. Id. at 624.
96. Id.
97. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
98. Romer, 517 U.S. at 623 (quoting Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
99. See id.
100. Id. at 633 ("Equal protection of the laws is not achieved through indiscriminate
imposition of inequalities." (quoting Swealt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629,635 (1950) and Shelley
v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948))).
101. Id. at 633-34 ("The guaranty of 'equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the
protection of equal laws.'" (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535,
541 (1942) and Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886))).
102. Id. at 635.
103. Id. at 632.
104. See id. at 632-35.
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Justice Kennedy, however, did not actually apply the traditional
rational basis test. This test typically involves examining whether any
conceivable rational basis exists for the government's action."o" While
paying lip service to the test, Justice Kennedy reached the holding by
jumping over it. He noted that "[i]n the ordinary case, a law will be
sustained if it can be said to advance a legitimate government interest,
even if the law seems unwise or works to the disadvantage of a
particular group, or if the rationale for it seems tenuous.""0 ' However,
consonant with his morality-based approach to constitutional adjudication, he then stated, "Amendment 2 confounds this normal process of
judicial review."o Having pronounced this is not "the ordinary case,"
Justice Kennedy turned the light of moral principle upon Amendment
2.108 He particularly focused on Amendment 2's requirement of a
constitutional amendment to enact protections against discrimination
based on sexual orientation.0 ' This requirement, in his view, set
apart one group of people by a single, and traditionally disfavored, trait
(homosexuality) and made it harder for them to seek legal safeguards of
their interests.' He observed that "[ilt is not within our constitutional tradition to enact laws of this sort.""' Moreover, he stated "laws of
the kind now before [the Court] raise the inevitable inference that the
disadvantage imposed is born of animosity toward the class of persons
affected.""' Without examining whether animosity inspired Amendment 2, Justice Kennedy concluded that no rational reason could be
advanced for any legislation engendered by such animosity, which made
Amendment 2 unconstitutional."'
Justice Kennedy's opinion in Romer initially appears straightforward.
Animus towards a socially disfavored group cannot serve as a rational
basis for the government's disparate treatment towards that group. A
closer reading, however, raises many questions. For one, why did
Justice Kennedy invoke the rational basis test but not employ it in its
traditional form? Given that sexual orientation remained so much on
the fringes of the opinion, how is Romer relevant to other forms of
discrimination against gay people? How is animus defined and to what
extent does it encompass moral disapproval? Justice Kennedy's analysis

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id. at 631.
Id. at 632.
Id. at 633.
Id. at 632.
Id. at 633.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 634.
Id. at 634-35.
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never mentioned Bowers v. Hardwick. How can the animus rationale he
enunciated in Romer logically coexist with the approval of the criminalization of sodomy in Bowers? Thus, in deciding the issue at hand, the
majority in Romer posed more questions than answers and treated gay
rights as more of an incidental factor to the outcome than a guiding
principle.
In stark contrast, Justice Scalia's dissent focused almost exclusively
on gay people and gay rights. His first sentence also set the tone for
what followed-"The Court has mistaken a Kulturkampf for a fit of
spite."114 Thus, unlike Justice Kennedy, Justice Scalia showed no
hesitation about invoking the culture war and, in fact, entered into it
with relish."'
Justice Scalia directly attacked Justice Kennedy's fundamental
premise that animus must necessarily lie at the root of any regulation
that makes participation in government harder for one group than for
others. 6 He noted that government regulation at the local level
routinely affects the rights of particular people, requiring those who seek
change to operate at a higher level of government under presumably
more difficult circumstances."' For that reason, he asserted Amendment 2 was neither as unusual nor as special as Justice Kennedy
claimed.1 s Before this decision, no one, Justice Scalia argued, had
ever equated such a fundamental aspect of the democratic system with
animus or found it to violate the Equal Protection Clause."'
Secondly, Justice Scalia pointed out that Bowers fundamentally
stripped the animus principle of any logic.' 20 Even if Amendment 2
embodied social disfavor of homosexual conduct, how, he argued, could
this disfavor be deemed evil enough to invalidate the Amendment when

114.

Id. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

115. See GARY R. HARTMAN ET AL., LANDMARK SUPREME COURT CASES: THE MOST
INFLUENTIAL DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 111 (2004)

("Romer could signal a greater willingness on the part of the Court to be an actor in
America's 'culture wars,' to use a term invoked in Justice Scalia's dissent.").
116. Romer, 517 U.S. at 640 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
117. Id. at 638-39.
118. Id. at 653.
119. Id. at 639. In an important footnote, Justice Scalia also makes two points that
further clarify the approach used by the majority in its equal protection analysis. He
states that the majority plainly believed the rational basis test properly applied to the
matter at hand. Id. at 640 n.1. Thus, as Justice Scalia observes, the majority evidently
rejected the Colorado Supreme Court's holding that Amendment 2 infringed upon a
"fundamental right" of persons, as homosexuals, to "participate equally in the political
process." Id. (quoting majority opinion at 625).
120. Id. at 640.
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Bowers permitted the criminalization of the same conduct? 1 2 1 Justice
Scalia noted that Justice Kennedy never referred to Bowers or resolved
this conundrum."2
Finally, Justice Scalia argued that homosexuals were not the
politically-disadvantaged class as Justice Kennedy described.2 2
He
noted the tendency of gay people to cluster in particular localities.1 2 4
This grouping, he stated, actually tipped the political scales in their
favor but out of proportion to their presence in society as a whole. 2
Given that, he portrayed Amendment 2 as adherents of traditional
values exercising their role in democracy to address this imbalance and
bring public policy back into line with traditional disapproval of
homosexual conduct. 12 6
The foregoing led Justice Scalia to conclude the majority had based its
holding not on law, but rather on its personal belief that disapproval of
homosexuality was morally wrong. Wading directly into the culture war,
he accused the majority and the entire legal academy of holding an
elitist acceptance of homosexuality that was out of touch with the
traditional moral values of people outside law schools' gates.127 The
majority in Romer, he asserted, sought to coerce a disapproving public
to accept homosexuality and shame those who did not.1 28
Justice Kennedy tried mightily to frame the issue in Romer as one of
universal principle standing apart from the ongoing culture war. Justice
Scalia's dissent, however, inexorably drew the majority opinion into that
war by giving it an overtly gay rights gloss. One can argue which
Justice made the better argument. However, Justice Scalia's argument
proved the more memorable for its clarity of language and directness of
approach. Unlike Justice Kennedy's opinion, which aimed for immortality and often seemed fuzzy, the dissent never aspired to be anything
other than a point-by-point rebuttal, which made it the stronger
129
opinion.

121. Id. at 640-41.
122. Id. (noting the majority neither mentions Bowers nor addresses the question it
raises: "whether there was a legitimate rational basis for the substance of the constitutional amendment").
123. Id. at 640.
124. Id. at 646.
125. See id.
126. Id. at 645-46.
127. Id. at 652-53.
128. See id. at 653 (referring to "[tihis law-school view of what 'prejudices' must be
stamped out").
129. See Rosen, supra note 72 (calling Justice Kennedy's writing "pompous and clueless
at the same time").

MERCER LAW REVIEW

320

[Vol. 67

Paradoxically, Justice Scalia's dissent, at the same time, cast Justice
Kennedy's opinion in a stronger light. Justice Scalia's innuendos about
the motivations behind the majority opinion, although grossly overstated, made it appear more proactive as a harbinger of further advances in
gay rights. Indeed, Justice Scalia, not Justice Kennedy, pointed out the
30
contradictory nature of the holdings in Romer and Bowers.o
Thus,
Justice Scalia, not Justice Kennedy, raised the possibility that the
holding in Romer cracked a chink in Bowers' wall.' Justice Scalia,
not Justice Kennedy, suggested that Romer indicated "the perceived
social harm of homosexuality" was not a legitimate government
concern.13 2 Justice Scalia, not Justice Kennedy, foresaw that the
Romer holding would lead to a day when sexual discrimination becomes
as morally reprehensible as discrimination based on race or religion. 1 3
Justice Kennedy's opinion expressed none of these things, but Justice
Scalia's dissent made it seem as though it had.
Moreover, the contrast between Justice Scalia's manic anger and
Justice Kennedy's quiet assuredness lent further strength to the
majority opinion. Oddly, the contrasting tones created a difference
between perception and reality. The majority opinion, based more on
personal philosophy than precedent, seemed like the reasoned opinion.
Conversely, Justice Scalia's dissent, based more solidly on precedent,
seemed to be the product of emotion. Indeed, Justice Scalia's intense
anger more clearly expressed the monumental turn the Romer majority
had taken from Bowers better than Justice Kennedy's majestic phrases
themselves.
V.

THE "ODD COUPLE's" LEGACY IN ROMER

Together, Justice Kennedy's majority opinion and Justice Scalia's
dissent indicated the Supreme Court had dramatically shifted its
attitude towards gay people. The Court's majority framed gay people,
not as criminal sodomites like Bowers v. Hardwick had done, but as
people."3 4 The contrast between the majority opinion and the dissent

130. Romer, 517 U.S. at 640-41 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
131. See Mark E. Papadopoulos, Inkblot Jurisprudence:Romer v. Evans as a Great
Defeat for the Gay Rights Movement, 7 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 165, 181 (1997) (noting
"a significant amount of legal literature concurs, although perhaps for different reasons,
with Justice Scalia's view that Romer, at a minimum, severely undermined Bowers").
132. Romer, 517 U.S. at 651 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 636.
134. Compare Bowers, 478 U.S. at 197 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (calling homosexuality
"a disgrace to human nature"), with Romer, 517 U.S. at 635 ("We must conclude that
Amendment 2 classifies homosexuals not to further a proper legislative end but to make
them unequal to everyone else . . .. A State cannot so deem a class of persons a stranger
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made that distinction clear. Justice Kennedy viewed the gay Coloradans
as persons entitled to dignified human treatment. 3 5 Justice Scalia
saw them as offenders of morality entitled to nothing but social
disapproval. 1 36 The Justices' starkly different outlooks, presented one
after the other, exemplified that some degree of change in the law's
treatment of gay people was in the air.13 7 How their joint contribution
in making this point may have affected the gay rights movement will be
discussed below.
Romer v. Evans gave gay rights organizations, shackled by Bowers, a
much needed shot in the arm.13 8 Political advocacy thrives on the
possibility that change can happen as much as it does on its actual
success. The possibility of change builds momentum, attracts more
active supporters, and generates greater financial support.' 9 It also
stimulates the rise of identity politics. 40 Romer demonstrated a
change in attitude towards gay people at the highest level and sparked
all of these things. Romer's acknowledgment of gay people's fundamental dignity provided a rallying point for the advocacy organizations. It
further cemented the notion of gay pride. Even Justice Scalia's dissent
played a positive role. It compensated for any juicy drama Justice
Kennedy's opinion lacked. On the one hand, the dissent represented an
opinion gay rights supporters could love to hate. On the other hand, its
doomsday tone suggested gay equality was not merely possible but
highly probable.
Thus, while Justice Kennedy's majority opinion
provided the cake to gay rights advocates, Justice Scalia's dissent added

to its laws.").
135. Romer, 517 U.S. at 635.
136. Id. at 636 ("This Court has no business imposing upon all Americans the
resolution favored by the elite class from which the Members of this institution are
selected, pronouncing that 'animosity' toward homosexuality. . . is evil.") (quoting majority
opinion at 628).
137. Lawrence C. Levine, JusticeKennedy's "Gay Agenda": Romer, Lawrence, and the
Struggle for MarriageEquality, 44 McGEORGE L. REV. 1, 8 (2013) ("The greatest challenge
of Romer is trying to comprehend its reach.").
138. See Civil Rights Monitor, THE LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE, no. 5-6, 1996,
http://www.civilrights.org/monitor/vol8_no5_6/art3.html
("Gay-rights advocates were
jubilant after the Court's decision. Elizabeth Birch, Executive Director of the Human
Rights Campaign, the largest national lesbian and gay political organization in the nation,
stated the Court's decision was 'an outstanding mor al [sic] victory' that 'merely ensures
that Colorado-and every other state-cannot pass laws to deny gay and lesbian Americans
equal access to the democratic process.'").
139. See Scott A. Giordano, Twenty Years as the Nation's Premier Gay and Lesbian
Civil Rights Group, EDGE BOSTON (Jan. 20, 2000), http://www.edgeboston.com/index.php?
ch=news&sc=&sc3=&id=58219&pf=1 (noting that between 1995 and 2000 the Human
Rights Campaign tripled in size).
140. Eskridge, No Promo Homo, supra note 20, at 1336-37.
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a highly satisfying icing. Together, they provided the mixture for a
powerful organizing tool.
Most importantly, together, the majority opinion and dissent in Romer
practically invited gay rights advocacy groups to challenge Bowers'
legitimization of criminal sodomy laws. Indeed, Justice Scalia, himself,
noted the contradictory nature of the holdings in the two cases. 14
Romer, as Professor William Eskridge noted, left Bowers "in equal
protection purgatory."' 42 Bowers' wounded state made equal protection
seem fair game and spurred gay rights groups to take action. 4" These
groups began earnestly looking for a sodomy arrest on which to build a
That time came when Houston Police arrested Tyron
challenge."'
Garner and John Lawrence under Texas' sodomy statute. 4 ' Ultimately, in Lawrence v. Texas, Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion
overruling Bowers.'s
Justice Scalia again angrily dissented.'
Thus, Romer indicated the path that gay rights advocates would tread
down to further victory.
The duality of Romer also drew attention in the public sphere.' 48
Scholars disagree on the extent judicial opinions influence public
attitudes.' 4 9 The confluence in Romer of positive and negative gay

141. Romer, 517 U.S. at 640-41 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
142. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Multivocal Prejudices and Homo Equality, 74 IND. L.J.
1085, 1091 (1999).
143. See Eskridge, No Promo Homo, supra note 20, at 1406 (noting the preference of
gay rights advocacy groups to act "only if there is a reasonable chance of success").
144. DALE CARPENTER, FLAGRANT CONDUCT: THE STORY OF LAWRENCE V. TEXAS 130
(2012) (calling the arrest "the spark the gay-rights movement had been awaiting for more
than a decade").
145. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562-63. The applicable statute, section 21.06(a) of the Texas
Penal Code Annotated, provided, "A person commits an offense if he engages in deviate
sexual intercourse with another individual of the same sex." TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 21.06(a) (West 2003).
146. See generally Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562-77. Justice Kennedy did not replicate the
animus analysis used in Romer, but he stated the statute violated the right of personal
autonomy granted by the Due Process Clause. Id. at 573-74.
147. See generally id. at 586-605 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia asserted the
majority applied "an unheard-of form of rational-basis review that will have far-reaching
implications beyond this case." Id. at 586.
148. See Richard Nunan, Constitutional Rights versus State Autonomy and Direct
Democracy: The Story So Far on Same-Sex Marriage,(APA) NEWSLETTER ON PHILOSOPHY
AND LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL AND TRANSGENDER ISSUES, Fall 2009, at 4 (noting the
prospect of judicial decisions attracts some attention by the general public).
149. Kevin Orszac, The Effects of Judicial Decisions on Public Support for Same-Sex
Marriage 3 (2011) (unpublished Senior Honors Thesis, New York University Politics
Department) (2011), http://politics.as.nyu.edu/docsflO/5628/Orszak.pdf ("Despite the
numerous studies regarding aggregate and individual-level opinion responses to court
decisions, a complete consensus has not emerged amongst political science scholars.").
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rights arguments may have cancelled out its potential to influence minds
not already leaning towards one side or the other.5 o However, the
disagreement between Justice Kennedy and Justice Scalia undoubtedly
appealed to the news media and may have increased coverage of gay
issues in general.'' The opinion brought gay rights out of the closet
on a national level. In some parts of the country, it may have provided
the first public demonstration of a government interest in gay equality.152 It stimulated public discussion. Much of that discussion surely
disparaged gay people as Justice Scalia did, or even worse. Yet, "for
better or worse," this discussion began the process of introducing the
The
idea of gay rights into the general public's consciousness.'
the
indicated
discourse
public
in
the
rights
of
gay
presence
enhanced
rights were an issue unlikely to go back in the closet.'
Of course, Romer stimulated the advocacy of opponents of gay rights
as well. Whereas gay rights proponents expressed uncertainty about
Romer's ramifications, the opponents immediately recognized the
holding's potential to erode traditional values."' In hindsight, these
opponents, like Justice Scalia, overestimated the speed with which such
change would occur. Yet, in many respects, they predicted the nature
of the change with surprising accuracy.' 5 6 Their advocacy against gay

150. See Paul R. Brewer, Framing, Value Words, and Citizens' Explanations of Their
Issue Opinions, 19 POL. COMM. 303, 311-12 (2002) (suggesting that the presentation of
competing frames of view can reduce their effectiveness to influence).
151. See Joseph Daniel Ura, The Supreme Court and Issue Attention: The Case of
Homosexuality, 26 POL. COMM. 430, 440 (2009) (reporting the outcome of a study, which
found Romer "significant[ly} influence[d]" USA Today's level of coverage of homosexual
issues). But see Brian J. Fogarty & James E. Monogan III, Modeling Time-Series Count
Data: The Unique ChallengesFacingPolitical Communication Studies, 45 Soc. Sci. RES.
73, 84-86 (2014) (reporting that several models do not support Ura's findings).
152. See Eskridge, Multivocal Prejudices, supra note 142, at 1095 ("Evans can be read
as the Court's recognition that the state contribution to the apartheid of the closet carries
with it today a modest state responsibility not to reinforce the closet.").
153. See Hunter, supra note 19, at 576-77 (2000) (noting that "dominant American
[hetero]sexual culture hinges on keeping the silence").
154. See Jane S. Schacter, Romer v. Evans and Democracy's Domain, 50 VAND. L. REV.
361, 403-05 (1997) (stating that "[cloerced invisibility [] works to reinforce gay inequality").
155. Compare Eskridge, Multivocal Prejudices, supra note 142, at 1086 ("Evans
contains broad language supporting claims for homo equality, but it arose in a unique
factual setting that could render it sui generis."), with Hadley Arkes, The End of
Democracy?A Culture Corrupted, FIRST THINGS (Nov. 1996), http://www.firstthings.com/
article/1996/11/005-the-end-of-democracy-a-culture-corrupted ("And now, with Romer v.
Evans, the Court has handed the activists a powerful new device for advancing the
movement ever further.").
156. See, e.g., Arkes, supra note 155 (asserting that Romer "could have vast, unsettling
effects on our law 'that it could be used as a powerful lever in changing the professions, the
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equality took a number of forms, ranging from scholarly argument to
public denunciations of homosexuality, that banded the old stereotypes
and exploited people's fear of new and different things.'
However,
the rabid cruelty of many of these denunciations no doubt swayed some
Americans who were sitting on the fence to cross to the gay rights
side.'"' Such cruelty probably also motivated gay rights advocates to
stay on top of their game to ensure the closet door never swung shut.
Individuals came out of the closet as well. Post-Romer, the rise in
number of openly gay people may have been attributable, in part, to the
publicity Romer generated about the gay rights movement and the boost
it gave to gay rights advocacy."' Seeing gay people, and realizing one
is not alone in being gay, frequently invokes a powerful self-recognition
of gay identity.'
How many people came out of the closet between
Romer and Lawrence will never be known. Undeniably, however, gay
people became more visible."' The number of gay couples forming
households increased significantly.' 6 2 At the same time, the likelihood
of Americans neither knowing nor having interacted with a gay person
significantly decreased.' 6 3

universities, and the cast of our private lives'"). Professor Arkes specifically feared the
advent of same-sex marriage. Id.
157. See, e.g., Lynn D. Wardle, The Potential Impact of Homosexual Parenting on
Children, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 833 (1997); see also Teresa Stanton Collett, Restoring
Democratic Self-Governance Through the FederalMarriageAmendment, 2 U. ST. THOMAS
L.J. 95 (2004).
158. The comments of Fred Phelps and supporters of the Westboro Church come
immediately to mind. See Gary Younge, Extreme Prejudice, GUARDIAN (Mar. 7, 2005),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2005/mar/07/gayrights.usa (noting calls for the death
of homosexuals).
159. Eskridge, No Promo Homo, supra note 20, at 1371 (asserting "the only likely
consequence-but a big one-of shifting policy in a progay direction is encouragement of
more open homosexuals and more public displays of homosexual identity" (alterations in
original)).
160. See Joseph J. Manera & Dennis A. Frank, II, Coming Out & Identity Development
Needs, in COUNSELING GAY MEN, ADOLESCENTS AND BOYS 12 (Michael M. Lout ed., 2014)
(noting that, in developing a personal gay identity status, "[i]ndividuals gain a certain
amount of definition through their interactions with others who share a similar identity").
161. Eskridge, No Promo Homo, supra note 20, at 1371 (asserting "the only likely
consequence-but a big one-of shifting policy in a pro-gay direction is encouragement of
more open homosexuals and more public displays of homosexual identity" (alterations in
original)).
162. Cheryl Wetzstein, Census:Households Led by Gay Couples Rose 80 Percent, WASH.
TIMES (Sept. 27, 2011), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/sep/27/census-house
holds-led-by-gay-couples-rose-80-percefpage=all (discussing findings of census data
between 2000 and 2010).
163. See Suzanne Goldberg, Introductions and Panel Discussion: Transcription of
Proceedings,46 S. TEX. L. REV. 323, 351(2004) (discussing the greater familiarity of people,
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As more gay people came out of the closet, the diversity of gay people
became more apparent. Also, as noted, more people came to know gay
people and began to think of them not as "the other," but as family,
friends, or acquaintances. Correspondingly, negative stereotypes about
gay people became less prevalent or, at least, less openly expressed in
polite company.'"
Gradually, public attitudes towards gay people
swung more in Justice Kennedy's direction than Justice Scalia's. None
of these social changes can be attributed specifically to Romer. However,
the majority opinion in Romer certainly ranks among the first prominent
and public renunciations of the gay stereotypes enshrined in Bowers.
Today, Justice Scalia's dissent in Romer appears mean-spirited and
coarse compared to the majority opinion. Thus, his dissent may have
contributed, albeit unintentionally, to a phenomenon it openly
scorns-the increasing prevalence of the belief that disparaging gay
people in public discourse is socially unacceptable."'
As gay visibility increased, gay people became harder to ignore. On
the one hand, this visibility created political momentum, most evidenced
by the adoption of anti-discrimination ordinances in numerous towns
and cities. On the other hand, it also created a steamroller effect in the
social sphere. Increased visibility made a once hidden facet of American
culture more integrated into the fabric of daily life. Popular culture
reflected this phenomenon as openly gay characters appeared frequently
in television shows and movies.'6 6 Even the fundamentally conservative American business community began to respond to the more visible
gay presence. An increasing number of companies instituted domestic
partnership benefits. 6 7 Thus, in terms of gay political and social
integration, America changed markedly during the seven years between
the Supreme Court holdings in Romer v. Evans and Lawrence v.

particularly Supreme Court Justices, with gay people).
164. See Eskridge, No Promo Homo, supra note 20, at 1376 (noting how the closet
breeds stereotyping).
165. See id. (explaining that stereotyping engenders inappropriate discourse).
166. Michael Medved, Homosexuality and the EntertainmentMedia, NEW OXFORD REV.
INC. (July 1, 2001), available at 2001 WLNR 9659436.
167. Domestic PartnerBenefits Doubled From 1997, EPM COMM. INC., availableat 2001
WLNR 12106061 ("The proportion of large U.S. companies offering domestic partner
benefits has more than doubled, to 22% from 10% in 1997, and 35% of companies that don't
offer such benefits indicate that they may begin to do so in the next three years, according
to Hewitt Associates. Three quarters (76%) of companies offering these benefits do so to
attract and retain employees . . . .").
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Texas.' The Court in Bowers could never have imagined gay people
becoming so ubiquitous in American life.
Romer's direct legal impact on the gay rights movement has, until
recently, been underestimated. Although some have credited Romer
with forestalling the enactment of pending laws similar to Amendment
2,169 others believed it did not live up to its promise.1 70 Indeed,
Justice Kennedy's opinion and Justice Scalia's dissent both discouraged
Romer's subsequent application to some degree. Justice Kennedy's
characterization of Amendment 2 as "unique" invited lower courts to
distinguish subsequent disparate treatment of gay people from the
treatment in Romer."' In addition, the amorphousness and subjectivity of "animus" impaired its usefulness as a measuring tool.'72 Finally,
Justice Scalia's clarification in his dissent-that the majority had not
employed heightened scrutiny in its examination of Amendment
2-foreclosed that line of inquiry in a number of later cases. 7
Recently, however, Romer has gained stature. Accordingly, a more
convincing argument can be made that Romer's majority and dissent
presaged a future line of gay rights jurisprudence and its consequences.
In Perry v. Brown,'74 for example, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit deployed Romer to find a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause."' In this case, the court focused on California's
Proposition 8, a ballot initiative that withdrew the right to marry from
same-sex couples.176 The court held that no reason could be attributed
to Proposition 8 other than animus towards gay people. 177 More

168. Jay Michaelson, On Listening to the Kulterkampf or, How America Overruled
Bowers v. Hardwick, Even Though Romer v. Evans Didn't, 49 DuKE L.J. 1559, 1560 (2000).
169. Dale Carpenter, A Pre-DecisionGuide to a Post-Decision World of Gay Marriage,
WASH. POST (Jan. 17, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/01/17/a-pre-decision-guide-to-the-post-decision-world-of-same-sex-marriage/.
170. William C. Duncan, The Legacy of Romer v. Evans-So Far, 10 WIDENER J. PUB.
L. 161, 185 (2000) ("A review of the cases discussing and citing Romer thus far seems to
indicate that the opinion has not had a major impact on the law."); Papadopoulos, supra
note 131, at 201 (asserting that, aside from its specific holding, "Romer is nothing if not
ambiguous").
171. Levine, supra note 137, at 8.
172. See Massachusetts v. United States HHS, 682 F.3d 1, 10-11 (1st Cir. 2012) (noting
that "[clircuit courts . . . have concluded that equal protection assessments are sensitive
to the circumstances of the case and not dependent entirely on abstract categorizations").
173. See, e.g., Cook v. Gates, 528 F.3d 42, 61 (1st Cir. 2008).
174. 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated and remandedsub nom. Hollingsworth v.
Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
175. Perry, 671 F.3d at 1076.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 1080-81.
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importantly, in United States v. Windsor, Justice Kennedy replicated the
Romer analysis and found such animus underlay and made unconstitutional the provision of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) 7 8 restricting the provision of federal benefits to marriages between a man and a
woman." In Windsor, Justice Scalia issued another Cassandra-like
dissent in a similar tone as his dissent in Romer. This time, however,
he predicted the institution of same-sex marriage nationwide. 8 0
In the recently decided Obergefell v. Hodges,' which found a
constitutional right to same-sex marriage, Justices Kennedy and Scalia
resumed their colloquy on gay rights.'8 2 Once again, Justice Kennedy
invoked the respect for human dignity as central to the determination
of eligibility for fundamental constitutional rights.1 3 Likewise, Justice
Scalia counters that this position amounts to the imposition of personal
preference over the rule of law.lM The roots of both arguments can,
of course, be traced to Romer. The intensity, not the content of the
Justices' arguments in Obergefell distinguishes the case from Romer and
the other successive gay rights cases.
Both Justices argued on steroids. Justice Kennedy, writing for the
majority, began by describing the "transcendent importance of marriage,"
which "[rises] from the most basic human needs" and is "essential to our
most profound hopes and aspirations." 88a Marriage achieves a status
as a fundamental constitutional right for several reasons. It invokes the
right of personal autonomy.' 8 6 It creates a uniquely personal bond

178. Pub. L. No. 104-99, 110 Stat. 2419 (codified at U.S.C. § 7 (2012) on Sept. 21, 1996).
179. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693-96 (explaining how the unique nature and
background of the DOMA provision revealed animus).
180. Id. at 2709 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("It takes real cheek for today's majority to
assure us, as it is going out the door, that a constitutional requirement to give formal
recognition to same-sex marriage is not at issue here-when what has preceded that
assurance is a lecture on how superior the majority's moral judgment in favor of same-sex
marriage is to the Congress's hateful moral judgment against it. I promise you this: The
only thing that will 'confine' the Court's holding is its sense of what it can get away with.").
181. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
182. See generally id.
183. See id. at 2602 (describing marriage generally as a fundamental right and noting
that "[u]nder the Constitution, same-sex couples seek in marriage the same legal treatment
as opposite-sex couples, and it would disparage their choices and diminish their personhood
to deny them this right").
184. Id. at 2628 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (characterizing the majority opinion as "lacking
even a thin veneer of law").
185. See id. at 2594 (majority opinion) (noting that marriage is a fundamental right
because it entails principles central to personhood such as the right of individual
autonomy, the uniqueness of the bond marriage exerts between committed individuals, and
the safeguarding of one's children).
186. Id. at 2599.
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It safeguards the rights of chilbetween committed couples.''
dren.'" Finally, it serves as the cornerstone of family and society.8 s
Accordingly, Justice Kennedy believed depriving same-sex couples of
marriage, and its associated benefits, "serve[d] to disrespect and
subordinate them" in violation of the Equal Protection and Due Process
Clauses."9 o Indeed, the passion with which Justice Kennedy laid out
these arguments, relating marriage to personal dignity and well-being,
reportedly resulted in portions of his opinion being included in marriage
vows at a number of same-sex marriage ceremonies that followed.' 9
On the other hand, Justice Scalia attempted to tear the Majority's
fundamental rights arguments to shreds in his remarkable pejorative
dissent. He mocked the "mummeries and straining-to-be memorable
passages of [Justice Kennedy's] opinion," which he called "profoundly
incoherent." 19 2 Having castigated Justice Kennedy's writing, Justice
Scalia pounced on its substance with even greater disdain. In his view,
the majority's decision represented a "Judicial Putsch," or, in other
words, "a naked judicial claim to legislative-indeed, super-legislative-power ...
fundamentally at odds with our system of government."'
Justice Scalia asserted that "to allow the policy question of
same-sex marriage to be considered and resolved by a select, patrician,
highly unrepresentative panel of nine is to violate a principle even more
fundamental than no taxation without representation: no social
transformation without representation."'9 4 Thus, Justice Scalia, too,
returned to the themes he expressed in Romer, albeit at an even more
dismissive level.
Obergefell makes Romer, once considered highly enigmatic,' seem
highly prophetic in hindsight. Moreover, Romer, which some deemed
insignificant as a catalyst to the further development of gay rights in
America,1 9 6 now appears increasingly relevant. Indeed, the Court's

187. Id. at 2599-600.
188. Id. at 2600.
189. Id. at 2601.
190. Id. at 2604.
191. Dahlia Lithwick, With this Withering Dissent, I Thee Wed: Subversive Language
of Love from the Supreme Court's Losers, SLATE (June 30, 2015), http://www.slate.com/arti
cles/newsand-politics/lowconcept/2015/06/supreme court obergefelldissentscelebrate_
a-marriagewith..decision language.html.
192. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2628, 2630 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
193. Id. at 2629.
194. Id.
195. See Papadopoulos, supra note 131, at 201 (calling Romer "ambiguous").
196. See Duncan, supra note 170, at 185 (asserting Romer had little subsequent
impact).

2016]

THE ODD COUPLE

329

endorsement of same-sex marriage has brought the Amendment 2
Politicians who share Justice Scalia's moral
question full circle.
disapproval of homosexuality have responded, or are responding, to
marriage equality by enacting state laws, which, once again, effectively
remove local government protections for gay people."'7 The intersection of same-sex marriage and issues of religious freedom again raises
questions about the role of notions of traditional morality in the
delineation of gay and lesbian people's constitutional rights."'
Thus,
the resurgence of Romer is likely to continue for the foreseeable future.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The majority opinion and dissent in Romer v. Evans combined to
change the course of gay rights in America. As a legal force against gay
discrimination, Romer appears more vital than ever. Although one
cannot precisely measure Romer's effect on the social fabric, Romer
surely served as a stepping-stone to the greater respect and equality gay
It deserves greater recognition for both
Americans enjoy today.
achievements.
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